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I. INTRODUCTION
World trade and international investments have expanded
rapidly over the past twenty-five years.! Not surprisingly, there has
For the convenience of Canadian readership, and at the request of the author,
the Editors of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law have not
conformed Canadian case and statute citations to the Seventeenth Edition of The
Bluebook.
t Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Toronto. This is the written version of an
oral presentation by the author at the Fordham Law School Eugene P. Delia S. Murphy
Conference on Corporate Law held on November 15, 2001. I am much indebted to Ian
Fletcher, Edward Flynn, Lynn LoPucki, Jeffrey MacIntosh, Dan Prentice, Harry Rajak,
and Jay Westbrook for providing me with information relevant to this topic and not
otherwise readily available, but I alone must assume responsibility for the views
expressed in this Article. In the preparation of this Article, I have also made use of a
memorandum on the same topic prepared by me in August 1998 and circulated among
the reporters and consultants to the American Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency
Project.
1. See Carl A. Nelson, Let Business Reduce World Poverty, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 1, 2002 (stating that since 1963, there has been a seventeen-
fold rise in world trade); see also Jeff Donn, America Responds: Border Control,
Attacks Bring Tightened Security at Checkpoint, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 24,
2001 ("[T]he cross-border business between the United States and its largest
trading partner, Canada, has expanded to $1.4 billion a day."); Ross P. Buckley,
Globalization Good? Bad? Both, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 31, 2001 ("[T]he cross-
border flow of capital into the largest economies increased 60 times between 1970
and 2000"); Vernon Ellis, Can Global Business Be a Force for Good?, NEW
STATESMAN, July 16, 2001 ("Since 1950, world trade has increased
fourteenfold .... [m]ore and more productive assets are acquired across borders,
with global foreign direct investment flows of $1.1 [trillion] in 2000.").
367
368 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
been a corresponding increase in the number of crossborder
insolvencies involving multinational enterprises, large and small,'
which has fueled the drive for greater harmonization among the
many different national rules governing the treatment of
crossborder insolvencies. Canada and the United States are very
active participants on both sides of this phenomenon. The two
countries are each other's largest trading partners, with over eighty
percent of Canada's external trade being with the United States?
Similarly, there has been a steady increase in the number of
crossborder insolvencies that have come before the courts of both
countries in which Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy' judges have
been called upon to recognize each other's proceedings and to
cooperate closely with a view to maximizing returns for creditors in
the liquidation of assets or to help bring about the reorganization
of an ailing enterprise.5
2. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Year in Review, 2001 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 34 ("[This past year, 2001] has seen a number of major
developments in cross-border insolvency cases and in the development of
international and domestic cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases."); see
also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Transnational Insolvency Project of the
American Law Institute, 17 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 99, 99 (2001) ("Global enterprises
operating in global markets must inevitably produce global bankruptcies. Their
number and importance rose in the last decade, despite the general prosperity,
and is likely to grow even greater during the downturn that is now underway.").
3. The U.S. accounted for 85.7% of Canada's total exports in 1999; in turn,
Canada imported 76.3% of its total imports from the U.S. Statcan CANSIM
Database, Series D399449, D399518, D397990, and D398058, available at
http://www.statcan.ca/english/CANSIM (last visited May 10, 2002).
4. In Canada, the term "bankruptcy" is usually restricted to liquidation
proceedings under Part II of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985,
chap. B-3 (2001) [hereinafter BIA]. Commercial reorganization proceedings
under Part III, Division 1 of the Act (known as "commercial proposals") and
"arrangements" with creditors under the Companies' Creditors Arrangements
Act, R.S.C. 1985, chap. C-36 (2001) [hereinafter CCAA], are usually referred to
by those names and, technically speaking are not bankruptcy proceedings. This
terminological distinction does not exist in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. To avoid
confusion, "bankruptcy" is used in this Article in the broader U.S. Code sense.
Similarly, the term "insolvency proceedings" is used in a non-technical sense to
cover both liquidation and reorganizational proceedings unless the context
indicates otherwise.
5. See, e.g., In re Toga Mfg. Co., 28 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)
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The literature describing these developments, both North
American and overseas, is very substantial, but there is one aspect
that does not appear to have received the attention it deserves.6
These are the problems particular to the reorganization or
liquidation of insolvent corporate groups. Large corporations are
typically organized in groups.7 The group may have a few affiliates
or a thousand or more.' Given the close business bonds between
(quoting the following Congressional pronouncement, "[p]rinciples of
international comity and respect for the judgments and laws of other nations
suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders under all of
the circumstances of each case, rather than being provided with inflexible
rules."); Menegon v. Philip Servs. Corp., [1999] O.J. No. 4080 (Ontario, Blair J.)
(involving a crossborder bankruptcy of a multi-national conglomerate with plans
filed in U.S. and Canadian courts). Compare Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson,
Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
329, 330-38 (1993) (discussing the need for cooperation in transnational
bankruptcies as well as shortcomings of U.S. bankruptcy laws that hinder such
cooperation) and Frederick Tung, Fear of Commitment in International
Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 555, 557-86 (2001) (discussing various
theories on how principles of cooperation should be applied in transnational
bankruptcy cases) with Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality
in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000) (expressing
continuing skepticism about the prospects for international agreement on the
applicable principles, particularly those involving corporate groups, and arguing
the case for cooperative territoriality based on the locality of the debtor's assets).
6. But see PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
PROBLEMS IN THE BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION OF PARENT AND
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 17.11 (1985 & Supp. 1999). A succinct and
valuable statement of some of the issues also appears in AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: PRINCIPLES OF
COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CASES AMONG MEMBERS OF
NAFTA: COUNCIL DRAFT 106-14 (2000). For general literature, see PETER
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW (1995) and Karl
Hofstetter, Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating
European Trends, 39 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 576 (1990).
7. See BLUMBERG, supra note 6, at § 17.11.
8. Loewen Inc., which filed for Chapter 11 in 1999, had 1,098 affiliates in the
group, although the filings only encompassed about 875 members. (The data was
supplied to the author by Edward M. Flynn, research analyst at the Executive
Office for the United States Trustee, Washington, D.C., and Professor Lynn M.
LoPucki. Professor LoPucki maintains a bankruptcy research database for large
Chapter 11 cases. See http://teddy.law.comell.edu:8090/lopucki.htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2002).
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Canada and the U.S., it is highly predictable that a U.S-centered
group will have affiliates in Canada, and vice versa. For a variety
of reasons, the failure of a major member of a group will often
jeopardize the financial survival of the whole group.
Consequently, it is very common in Canada and the U.S. for a
corporate group to make a joint insolvency filing encompassing all
or most of the members of the group, with a view to reorganizing
the affairs of the whole enterprise or to bring about a going
concern sale if that course of action should be decided upon.9 The
consolidation may be procedural ("procedural consolidation") or,
much less frequently, substantive in character ("substantive
consolidations"). The evidence indicates that seventy per cent or
more of major corporate restructurings in Canada and the U.S. are
in some form of consolidated basis.1" This then raises the question,
in the case of crossborder insolvencies, of how well the Canadian
and U.S. bankruptcy rules and principles dovetail with one another
to bring about successful joint proceedings in both countries.
There is another side to the coin. The insolvency proceedings
may be limited to one member of the group. Nevertheless,
creditors of the insolvent company may argue that the parent
company was so deeply implicated in the affairs of the failing
affiliate that it should be held jointly responsible for the liabilities
of the affiliate. Yet again, even if there is no attempt to hold the
parent company directly liable, the trustee may argue that a claim
the parent company may have against' the affiliate should be
subordinated to the claims of other creditors because the parent
company abused its dominant position. These are familiar issues in
domestic insolvency law.1 The question for consideration is how
9. See ED FLYNN, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 1115, tbl. 11A (1989); see also information
supplied to author by Professor Lynn M. LoPucki on Feb. 3, 2002 (on file with
the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law). Of the 274 cases, covering
the period 1980-2001, in Professor LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database,
only seventy-three filings (27%) were by a single entity. Id. Professor LoPucki
also identified approximately one third of the cases in his database as having at
least one foreign corporation in the corporate group. Id.
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310 (1939) (citing In re Burntside
Lodge, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 785 (D.C. Minn. 1934) as follows:
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well they play out in a crossborder context where the parent
company is U.S. based and the subsidiary is located in Canada, and
vice versa with respect to a Canadian parent company and a U.S.
based subsidiary. Having said this, I must also add quickly that
most of the Canada-U.S. crossborder cases I am familiar with have
involved problems of the first type, those arising from consolidated
filings, and not from attempts to hold a parent company liable for
the activities of its affiliates."
II. Two PRELIMINARY POINTS
A. Meaning of "Corporate GrouD"
For the purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to engage in
a technical analysis of the meaning of "corporate group." I use the
term to describe a group of companies with a common parent,
proximate or remote, including of course a direct parent-subsidiary
relationship.'3
B. Canadian Domestic Insolvency Regimes
Insolvency conflict of law rules operate within the matrix of
the domestic regime of which they are a part. Optimally,
therefore, a reader studying the Canada-U.S. interactions should
The relations of a stockholder to a corporation and to the public require good
faith and fair dealing in every transaction between the stockholder and the
corporation which may injuriously affect the rights of creditors and the general
public, and a careful examination will be made into all such transactions in the
interests of creditors.);
id.; see also Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and
Affiliated Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 562 (1975)
(discussing issues of liability between parent and subsidiary companies).
12. An example can be found in the reorganization of the Bramalea Group
of companies, infra text accompanying notes 93-103 (involving a restructuring
under the CCAA of a major North American real estate corporation,
headquartered in Toronto, which caried on business through numerous
operating subsidiaries in Canada and the U.S.); see also Menegon v. Philip Servs.
Corp., [1999] O.J. No. 4080 (Ontario, Blair J.).
13. See BIA § 4(2) (2001) (defining "related person"); see also 11 U.S.C. §
101(2) (2000) (defining "affiliate").
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have some knowledge of both bankruptcy systems.' Most readers
of this article will be familiar with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code but
may know little about Canadian insolvency law. I offer the
following highly condensed overview of the Canadian terrain.
Under Canada's constitution, the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to questions of bankruptcy and
insolvency. 5 Canada's basic insolvency rules are found in the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA"), 6 known before 1992 as
the Bankruptcy Act. The forerunner of the present Act was
adopted in 1919 and was largely based on the British Bankruptcy
Act of 1914." The 1919 Act was revised in 1949. The 1949 Act, in
turn, was extensively amended in 1992" and 1997.1' Further
amendments are anticipated in the near future.
Canada has no system of federal bankruptcy courts. Instead,
the judges of the superior courts in each province, all of whom are
appointed by the federal government, are authorized to sit as
bankruptcy judges in conformity with arrangements made by the
chief justice in each province.' Appeals from bankruptcy court
decisions are to the regular appellate courts of the province, and
from them to the Supreme Court of Canada. 1
14. It is for this reason that Phase 1 of the American Law Institute's
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECr, supra note 6, was devoted to statements
of the domestic insolvency systems of the three NAFTA partners, Canada, the
U.S., and Mexico.
15. Canada, Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30-31 Vict., ch. 3, § 91(21).
16. See generally supra note 4.
17. See Jacob S. Ziegel, Secured Transactions in Personal Property and the
Federal-Provincial Conflict in Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 46 S.C. L. REv. 877,
881 (1995). One basic departure from the British model was the fact that the
1919 Canadian Act applies to incorporated companies as well as to individuals
and unincorporated businesses. See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Modernization of
Canada's Bankruptcy Law in a Comparative Context, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 3
(1998). This integrated approach may have been influenced by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and remains a distinguishing feature of the BIA as
compared with its British counterparts. See id.
18. See Ziegel, Modernization, supra note 17, at 3.
19. Id.
20. BIA §§ 183-85 (2001). The federal Minister of Industry can also
designate members of other courts to sit as bankruptcy judges. Id. § 186.
21. Id. §§ 183(2) & (3).
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The BIA recognizes both voluntary and involuntary
proceedings in straight bankruptcies and reorganizations.'
However, the debtor's insolvency is a precondition in all insolvency
proceedings and it is generally assumed that the federal
government's bankruptcy and insolvency power imposes this
requirement.
Canada has two quite distinct commercial reorganizational
regimes: (1) the "commercial proposals" regime governed by Part
III Division 1 of the BIA,' and (2) the "creditors' arrangements"
regime found in the Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act
("CCAA"). 2 The BIA regime is available to individuals and
unincorporated businesses as well as incorporated businesses
regardless of the size of the debtor's liabilities.' Division 1
reorganizations are perceived to be very rule oriented, at least in
comparison with the loosely structured provisions of the CCAA.
The CCAA is restricted to corporate entities, whether
incorporated under Canadian or foreign law,26 and the debtor
corporation and its affiliates, if any, must owe at least Can. $5
million to creditors.' The CCAA is significantly shorter than
Division 1 and still has many gaps in it despite substantial
amendments made in 1997. In practice, most large corporations
opt to reorganize under the CCAA because they prefer its greater
flexibility and are attracted by the courts' willingness to bridge any
gaps by invoking their "inherent jurisdiction" to craft judicially
made rules to enable the Act to function properly.28
In terms of substantive rules, Canadian bankruptcy law fully
recognizes prebankruptcy security agreements so long as they
comply with relevant, usually provincial, law and are perfected in
accordance with applicable requirements (again, usually of
22 Id. §2.
23. Id. §§ 50-66.
24. See supra note 4.
25. See BIA § 2 (defining "person").
26. CCAA § 2 (defining "company").
27. Id. § 3.
28. For detailed descriptions of how Canadian courts apply the CCAA in
practice, see JACOB S. ZIEGEL & DAVID E. BAIRD, CASE STUDIES IN RECENT
CANADIAN INSOLVENCY REORGANIZATIONS: IN HONOUR OF THE HONOURABLE
LLOYD WILLIAM HOULDEN (1997) [hereinafter CASE STUDIES].
2002]
374 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
provincial origin.)29 However, federal laws also play a significant
role in the case of bank secured financing. Rules governing
voidable preferences and voidable transfers are found both in
provincial laws and in the BIA,3° but are not as strict or
comprehensive in their impact as are the rules in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.
The BIA has no provisions authorizing substantive
consolidations of the assets and liabilities of related debtors in
bankruptcy, but Canadian courts have followed U.S. precedents in
recognizing a common law power to make such orders if the
circumstances warrant it." It remains unsettled whether Canada
has adopted the American doctrine of equitable subordination?2
However, the federal and provincial business corporations Acts
contain powerful "oppression remedy" provisions which, so far as
insiders are concerned, may lead to the same results as equitable
subordination.33 Canadian federal and provincial courts also have
common law powers to lift the corporate veil to prevent
incorporation abuses. However, the power is used much more
sparingly than appears to be the case in the United States. Canada
has no common law doctrine of successor liability.
Prior to 1997, Canada had no statutory rules for the
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and the extension of
assistance to foreign representatives.34 Instead, recognition was
based on fragmented and not always consistent common law
29. See BIA § 72(1) (2001) (other federal and provincial laws continue to
apply unless incompatible with the BIA); see also id. § 67(1) (stating that except
as otherwise provided, all property of the debtor passes to the trustee in straight
bankruptcies.). All the common law provinces in Canada have adopted an
Article 9 type version of a Personal Property Security Act; Quebec, a civil law
jurisdiction, adopted its own version of Article 9 in the 1994 revision of the Civil
Code of Quebec.
30. See id. §§ 90-100.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
32. See infra text accompanying note 115.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 124-125.
34. The common law position is discussed in J. S. Ziegel, Canadian Law in
Transnational Insolvency Cases, in American Law Institute, Transnational
Insolvency Project, International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law,
(forthcoming May 2002) (manuscript at 89 et seq., on file with the Fordham
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).
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precedents. The 1997 amendments added a new Part XIII to the
BIA3 and added similar but truncated recognitional rules to § 18.6
of the CCAA.36 These provisions are substantially different in
structure from the provisions in §§ 304-306 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code37 and arguably less generous. Canada has not so far adopted
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies38 but
the desirability of doing so is under active consideration.
III. REORGANIZATIONS OF CROSSBORDER INSOLVENT
CORPORATE GROUPS
A. Problems in Procedural Consolidation
1. Initiating the Proceedings
The premise on which the following discussion proceeds is that
management of a corporate group, whose members are located in
Canada and the U.S., have decided that the group needs to be
reorganized. This may be because the group, as a common
enterprise, is insolvent or on the verge of insolvency even though
individual members of the group may be solvent, or it may be
because one or more members of the group are facing mass tort
suits which, if even partially successful, will rapidly deplete the
group's collective financial resources.39
The first question management's legal advisors will have to
confront is whether to aim for procedural or substantive
consolidation of the proceedings in the group's home jurisdiction.
35. BIA §§ 267-275 (2001).
36. CCAA § 18.6 (2001).
37. 11 U.S.C. §§ 304-306 (2000).
3& United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 I.L.M. 1386 (1997), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/insolven/insolvency.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2002) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
39. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Canada (Re) (2000) 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157
(Ont.) and U.S. counsel's affidavit in support of the application for assistance by
the Ontario court.
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It is generally accepted that a substantive consolidation order is
difficult to secure in both Canada and the U.S., ' because it implies
dismantling the walls separating the members of the group and
putting all the unsecured assets and liabilities into a common
estate. Procedural consolidation, on the other hand, follows almost
as a matter of course and merely requires compliance with rules of
venue and procedure. The substantive right and obligations of
members of the group are left intact." The evidence is that
procedural consolidation is almost de rigueur where a financially
distressed group seeks to reorganize itself.'
However, even in procedural consolidations, there arejurisdictional and recognitional problems so far as Canada is
concerned. With respect to U.S. proceedings, title 28, § 1408(2)
apparently allows any number of affiliates to file in the same
district court so long as the first petitioner has its domicile,
residence, principal place of business or principal assets in the
district of the district court. 3 Once the filing has been made,
Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) then allows the bankruptcy court to
make an order for the joint administration of the estate."
40. See generally Fred S. Hodara & Robert J. Stark, Protecting Distributions
for Commercial Creditors in Asbestos-Related Chapter 11 Cases, 10 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAC. 383, 415-16 (2001) ("Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly
authorize the substantive consolidation of bankruptcy estates, courts have
rendered such orders, relying upon their general equitable jurisdiction."); Selinda
A. Melnik, Cross-Border Insolvencies: The United States Perspective - A Primer,
628 PLI/CoMM. 225 (1992) ("Substantive consolidation.., is viewed as a drastic
remedy which is granted sparingly and only after carefully weighing the prejudice
that certain creditors may suffer absent consolidation against the prejudice to
others occasioned by consolidation.").
41. Cf. Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Leavitt Structural Tubing, 55 B.R.
710, 711-12 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 796 F.2d 477 ("[P]rocedural consolidation is
merely a matter of convenience and cost saving; it does not create substantive
rights."); In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5, 5-6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The joint
administration of an estate involves merely handling the two cases together for
administrative purposes: i.e., appointing one trustee, keeping one docket, etc.,
while the consolidation of cases treats the consolidated estates as one and may
affect the substantive rights of creditors.").
42 But see infra text accompanying notes 105-106 (stating that partial defacto consolidations appear to be very common in U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2000).
44. FED R. BANKR. P. § 1015(b).
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In Canada, neither the BIA nor the CCAA has a counterpart
to Title 28, § 1408(2). Section 2 of the CCAA defines a "debtor
company" as one "having assets or doing business in Canada"'45
without making allowances for corporate groups Similarly,
voluntary proposal proceedings under the BIA must involve an
insolvent person, which is defined inter alia as a person who
resides, carries on business or has property in Canada.'
Occasionally, a question arises whether a U.S. based affiliate
satisfies the BIA or CCAA jurisdictional requirements,47 but if
need be, a small bank account can always be opened in the name of
the affiliate to establish the presence of assets in Canada.
Significantly greater difficulties arise because of the BIA and
CCAA requirements that the debtor must be "an insolvent
person" (BIA)' or a "bankrupt or insolvent debtor company"
(CCAA).49
2. Recognitional Problems
Assuming group proceedings have been properly initiated in
Canada or the U.S., the next question to be considered is how
readily those proceedings will be recognized in the other
jurisdiction. The answer is, at least theoretically, that significant
recognitional problems arise under both U.S. and Canadian law.
Like the Canadian legislation, the Bankruptcy Code does not
establish a separate status for corporate groups. Rather, § 304(a)
provides that a foreign representative may commence a case
ancillary to the foreign proceeding, with "foreign proceeding"
being defined" as a proceeding in a foreign country in which the
debtor's domicile, residence, place of business or principal assets
were located at the commencement of the proceeding. Interpreted
literally, these requirements would be difficult to satisfy where the
foreign representative seeks to acquire § 304(a) status vis-a-vis a
45. CCAA § 2 (2001) (defining "debtor company").
46. BIA § 2 (2001) (definition of "insolvent person").
47. See, e.g., CASE STUDIES, supra note 28, at 18, 41 n.2.
48. BIA § 2 (defining "insolvent person").
49. CCAA § 2 (defining "debtor company").
50. 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2000).
2002] 377
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wholly U.S. based member of the group."
So far as Canada is concerned, the '1997 amendments to the
BIA do not mirror the U.S. Code requirement that the debtor must
have its place of business or principal assets in the foreign
jurisdiction, but this is a small consolation. There is a long-
standing Anglo-Canadian conflict of laws rule that a foreign
insolvency proceeding is only entitled to be recognized in Canada
if the debtor has its domicile in that jurisdiction. 2 That rule was
recently applied by Registrar Funduk in Alberta53 in refusing to
recognize Chapter 11 proceedings initiated in New York, as part of
a group filing, against the Alberta-based subsidiary and other
subsidiaries of the Singer Company NV, and refusing the
applicant's request for a stay of proceedings against the
respondents to enforce a judgment against Singer Canada.'
As must be obvious, these technical requirements in both the
Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy legislation are inappropriate for
corporate groups and need to be updated. There are two
solutions.55  One is to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law56
approach and entitle even a non-main foreign proceeding
("NMFP")57 to recognition and some assistance by the requested
51. This requirement was recently strictly applied by the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court in rejecting Teleglobe Inc.'s application for Section 304 status
with respect to Teleglobe's U.S. based subsidiaries. See Teleglobe Plans Suffer
Setback, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 27, 2002, at B.1.
52. See Singer Sewing Mach. Co. of Can. Ltd. (Re), 2000 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS
47707, at *14 (Alta. Q.B.) ("Comity does not require [a Canadian court] to
recognize a Chapter 11 order over a Canadian company carrying on business only
in Canada and whose assets are all in Canada. Who the shareholders are is
irrelevant and who the creditors are is irrelevant.").
53. Id; see also Jacob S. Ziegel, Corporate Groups and Canada-U.S.
Crossborder Insolvencies: Contrasting Judicial Visions, 35 CAN. Bus. L.J. 459,
459-60 (2001) (comparing recent crossborder bankruptcy cases decided in
Canada, including Singer Sewing Machine, with particular emphasis on analyzing
the willingness of courts in Canada to recognize proceedings in the U.S., and vice
versa).
54. See Singer, 2000 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 47707.
55. There is also a third solution, quite often applied by Canadian courts in
recent ex parte applications by counsel for U.S. debtors, and this is to disregard
the common law domiciliary rule, at least for purposes of a stay order in Canada.
56. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 38.
57. See id. at Art. 2(c).
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country's courts." The other solution is to adopt the
recommendation in the American Law Institute's ("ALI")
Principles of Cooperation59 to the effect that it shall be permissible
to file bankruptcy for a subsidiary in the same jurisdiction as the
parent company's bankruptcy, and to have either procedural or
substantive consolidation under applicable law, absent a
proceeding involving the subsidiary in the country of its main
interests. °
I believe the ALI Report has it right. However, its solution
does not overcome the long held view in Canada that the federal
government's bankruptcy and insolvency power is restricted to
insolvent debtors.6' If the constitutional restriction exists,
presumably it applies to the recognition and regulation in Canada
of foreign insolvency proceedings as well as to the initiation of
purely domestic proceedings.62 In my view, the self-imposed fetters
on the Canadian federal government's legislative powers are ripe
for reconsideration.
It is generally assumed that a corporate group, like a single
corporation, only has one center of gravity. However, this
proposition was questioned in the Maxwell Communication case.63
The parent company was incorporated under English law and
England was the financial and governance center of the Maxwell
Group.6'  On the other hand, Maxwell's most important
subsidiaries were located and managed in the U.S. Furthermore, a
Chapter 11 petition was actually filed in New York a day earlier
58. See id. at Art. 17, 21; see also Ziegel, Corporate Groups, supra note 53, at
486-89.
59. TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION
IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Tentative Draft, April 14, 2000).
60. Id.
61. Ziegel, Corporate Groups, supra note 53, at 472-74.
62. Arguably, a broader jurisdictional basis for the Canadian federal
government's recognitional power could be located in the federal government's
trade and commerce power in § 91(2) of the Constitution Act, but the Federal
government has not sought to rely on it so far.
63. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994), affd, complaint dismissed at 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 93 F.3d
1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
64. In re Maxwell, 170 B.R. at 801-02.
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than the initiation of administration proceedings under the British
Insolvency Act.' The U.S. bankruptcy court took the position that
U.S. interest in the administration of the U.S. based assets and
protection of the claims of U.S. creditors was as great as England's
with respect to the group as a whole." Happily, the momentary
impasse was resolved by the British and U.S. judges agreeing on
joint administration of the Maxwell estate and the appointment of
a U.S. examiner by Judge Brozman under Chapter 11 to facilitate
the harmonization and coordination of the proceedings in the two
countries. 7
Joint administration of the estates of corporate groups with
affiliates in Canada and the U.S. has become a common
crossborder feature between Canada and the U.S. for the past
decade or more.' Joint administration requires no formal finding
that the group has more than one center of gravity. Rather it
reflects the fact that both jurisdictions believe their creditors have
a sufficiently high stake in the proper administration of the estates
in each country that neither court should be expected to surrender
its jurisdiction to the other.
3. Exterritorial Application of Automatic Stays and Injunctive
Orders
An issue that has surfaced in recent years in Canada and that
is unrelated to joint administration of estates involves the question
of how much recognition should be given in Canada to automatic
stays arising under § 362 of the U.S. Code and to injunctions issued
by U.S. bankruptcy courts69 with respect to proceedings against
non-debtor affiliates of a debtor corporation.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, The Role of the Examiner
as Facilitator and Harmonizer in the Maxwell Communication Corporation
International Insolvency, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, ch. 25 (J. S. Ziegel ed., 1994).
68. See, e.g., Olympia & York in CASE STUDIES, supra note 28, at ch. 6 and
the Everfresh Reorganization in CASE STUDIES, supra note 28, at ch. 14.
69. Pursuant to the bankruptcy court's ancillary powers under Code, 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
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The scope of automatic stays under § 362 is much broader than
the stay of proceedings triggered under the BIA, which is limited
to proceedings by creditors against the debtor or the debtor's
property." Also, the BIA has no counterpart to the ancillary
powers provision in §105(a) of the U.S. Code,71 often used by U.S.
courts in class action bankruptcies to issue injunctions protecting
non-debtor affiliates of the debtor from hostile proceedings and to
seek the assistance of foreign courts in applying the injunction to
foreign based affiliates of the U.S. debtor corporation.72 Canadian
courts have acceded to these requests in ex parte applications but
without discussion of the apparent anomaly that a U.S. stay or
injunctive order may be given a wider reach than is available
domestically to a debtor in Canada under the BIA. It seems clear
that the UNCITRAL Model Law avoids the anomaly by not obliging
the authorities in the requested country to apply a broader stay
than is available under the forum's domestic law.73
B. The Challenges of Concurrent Insolvency Proceedings
As previously mentioned, concurrent proceedings are very
common in crossborder insolvencies spanning Canada and the
U.S."' The resulting legal and administrative challenges are
formidable, particularly given the many substantive and procedural
differences in the bankruptcy laws of the two countries. Happily,
in most cases the problems have been reduced to manageable size
thanks to close cooperation between bankruptcy judges on both
sides of the border and the courts' approval of protocols to govern
the administration of the estates.75
70. See BIA §§ 69, 69.1, 69.3 (2001). The stay does not apply to secured
creditors in straight bankruptcy proceedings. Id. § 69.3(2). The position is
different under the CCAA because the court imposed stays under § 11 apply to
all proceedings against the debtor company and are not restricted to proceedings
by the debtor's creditors.
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
72. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox, supra note 39.
73. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 20(1); see also Ziegel, Corporate Groups,
supra note 53, at 487-88.
74. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
75. See E. Bruce Leonard, Breakthroughs in Court-to-Court Communications
2002]
382 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
The easiest cases are those where there is no substantive
consolidation and assets and liabilities belonging to each affiliate of
the group can be readily segregated. Then each jurisdiction
essentially applies its own claims and priority rules for distribution
of the net proceeds of the estates. The task becomes much more
challenging when assets and liabilities among members of the
group are so hopelessly intermingled that substantive consolidation
becomes unavoidable. Whose insolvency rules should be applied
and when? To what extent can courts waive rules in crossborder
proceedings that would be mandatory in purely domestic cases?76
Whose voidable transfer rules apply?77 Can Chapter 11 type plans
be used binationally to overcome rigidities in insolvency rules?
Clearly there is much scope for creative engineering by counsel in
such cases.7"
C. Total and Partial Substantive Consolidations
1. The Canadian Position
Substantive consolidation of the cases of members of a group
are of course a well established feature of U.S. insolvency law.79
This is true even though there is a difference of opinion among
U.S. courts about the tests to be applied to determine whether such
an order should be made.' Canadian courts too have embraced
the doctrine8" because of its compelling logic where the business of
in Cross-Border Cases, AM. BANKR INST. J., at 165 (2001).
76. See, e.g., Bank of Credit and Commerce International (No.10) [1996] 4
All. Eng. Rep. 796 (including a holding by the Vice-Chancellor that the set off
rules in the British Insolvency Act were mandatory and that the English based
funds of the Bank could not be released to the foreign liquidators without
allowing the set off claims; see also IAN FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-75 (1999).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000); cf. Peter Kennedy, 360 Net Given Deadline
on U.S. Creditor Concerns, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 14, 2002, at B3.
78. See CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 67, at chs. 24 & 26.
79. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 2:105.09[1][A] (15th rev. ed.).
80. See id. at 2:05.09[2].
81. See New Zealand Law of Companies, LNZ Companies § 352 (2002).
Unlike other Commonwealth courts, such as England and Australia, which have
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the group has been conducted as if it were a single entity and
outsiders were not aware of the group's legal structure or did not
care with which member of the group they dealt.
According to Ellen Hayes, a Canadian author, up to 1994 at
least sixteen consolidated plans of arrangements were attempted in
Canada.' Several of these involved uncontested plans and did not
answer the question whether substantive consolidations were part
of Canadian law. 3 The substantive issue was raised before the
British Columbia Court of Appeal In re Northland Properties."
The Court there found statutory authority to make a consolidation
order in § 20 of the CCAA.8 The section provides that the CCAA
provisions can be applied conjointly with the provisions of any Act
authorizing compromises or arrangements between a company and
its shareholders.' The applicants in Northland had applied for
approval of the plan and amalgamation of the companies not only
under the CCAA but also under the British Columbia Companies
Act."'
Since then, Canadian courts have made consolidation orders in
at least four other cases,' one of which expressly relied on
Northland.9 The Court of Appeal's reliance in Northland on § 20
of the CCAA was not very persuasive since the section does not
predicate the existence of multiple debtor companies.' Justice
not legislated on the issue, New Zealand has adopted a statutory provision
conferring discretionary powers on the courts to permit substantive
consolidation.
82. Ellen L. Hayes, Substantive Consolidation Under the Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 23 CAN. Bus.
L.J. 444, 445 (1994).
83. Id.
84. (1989) B.C.L.R.2d 122 (Brit. Columbia).
85. Id.
86. See R.S.C., ch. c-36, § 20 (2001) (Can.).
87. (1989) 3 W.W.R. 363, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195.
88. See Re Fairview Indus. Ltd. (1991), 11 C.B.R. (N.S. 3d) 43 (N.S.); see also
Re Lehndorff Gen. Partners Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont.); Re A & F
Baillargeon Inc. (1993), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 27 (Que.), and Re Assoc. Freezers of Can.
Inc. (1995), 36 C.B.R. (3d) 227 (Ont.). These cases do not include the CCAA
cases discussed below.
89. Re Fairview Indus. Ltd. (1991), 11 C.B.R. (N.S. 3d) 43 (N.S.).
90. See CCAA, R.S.C., ch. c-36, § 20 (2001) (Can.).
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Trainor's judgment at the trial level in Northland is more helpful
since he relied on U.S. precedent and not on § 20 of the CCAA.9"
He also adopted the following balancing test appearing in In re
Baker and Getty Fin. Services Inc.: "The propriety of ordering
substantive consolidation is determined by a balancing of interests.
The relevant inquiry asks whether 'the creditors will suffer greater
prejudice in the absence of consolidation than the debtors (and any
objecting creditors) will suffer from its imposition."'92
Several of the substantive consolidations have involved
restructurings under the CCAA by large corporate groups with
strong crossborder links to the U.S. An arresting example of one
such consolidation involved the Bramalea group of companies.93
Bramalea was a major North American real estate corporation,
headquartered in Toronto, which carried on business through
numerous operating subsidiaries in Canada and the U.S."
Bramalea was also a party to many partnerships and joint venture
arrangements. Bramalea had a complex debt structure involving
dozens of special project loans, both to the company itself and to
several of its subsidiaries and joint ventures." Bramalea also had
secured lines of credit from two Canadian chartered banks and a
floating charge debenture issue in the principal amount of Can.
$500 million.96
Based on a balance sheet analysis alone, some of the
subsidiaries arguably were not insolvent. This created problems
for the CCAA proceedings, given that (as previously mentioned)
the Act requires all debtor companies to be insolvent.' However,
Bramalea took the position that the viability of the subsidiaries
91. (1991) B.C.L.R.2d 122.
92 In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc., 78 B.R. 139, 142 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987). Despite his extensive discussion of the U.S. doctrine, Justice Trainor did
not in fact make a consolidation order since he thought it was premature for him
to do so at this early stage of the case; see also Ralph McRae, Northland
Properties Ltd. in CASE STUDIES, supra note 28, at ch. 4.
93. For a detailed discussion, see R. Gordon Marantz, The Bramalea Story in
CASE STUDIES, supra note 28, at ch. 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2-5.
97. See CCAA §§ 2 (2001) (defining "debtor company); see also id. § 4.
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could not be sustained without Bramalea's support." The initial
draft court material prepared by Bramalea's counsel therefore
focused on the insolvency of the group as a whole." For the
purposes of the CCAA filing Bramalea and its subsidiaries,
Canadian and American, were treated as a single business entity.
Bramalea subsequently filed a prepackaged plan of
arrangement under the CCAA, which was subsequently approved
by the various classes of creditors, secured and unsecured."l The
key features of the plan, as accepted for filing by Justice Lloyd
Houlden of the Ontario Court of Appeal acting as trial judge in
these proceedings,"'1 were these:
(a) the court implicitly accepted Bramalea's contention that it
was a single integrated business operating in both Canada and
the U.S., so the affairs of numerous Canadian and U.S.
corporations were substantively consolidated;
(b) the court made a single order imposing a global stay of
proceedings, not only in respect of Bramalea but also in respect
of a large number of its affiliates;
(c) in making the stay order, the court accepted a broad
geographical jurisdiction purporting to stay U.S. creditors with
direct claims over U.S. assets;
(d) proceedings involving numerous Canadian and U.S.
corporations were consolidated into one proceeding;
(e) classes of creditor were substantively consolidated, that is,
creditors of different corporate entities were treated as if they
were all creditors of one entity;
(f) U.S. creditors were consolidated with Canadian creditors;
and
98. Marantz, supra note 93, at 6.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 21-22.
101. Justice Houlden was a leading bankruptcy counsel during his many years
at the Ontario Bar and also served as a trial judge before his elevation to the
Ontario Court of Appeal. Philosophically, as a youngster who had lived through
the Depression of the 1930s, he was very much committed to the reorganization
of insolvent businesses as a means of saving jobs and enterprises.
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(g) cross-border entities, projects & creditors were
consolidated, all funds were pooled rather than being
segregated according to specific projects, and there was no ring
fencing of assets.!°2
As will be noted, the plan of arrangement not only treated the
Bramalea group as a single entity but included the U.S. as well as
the Canadian subsidiaries. In short, the plan ignored national
boundaries and treated all creditors as being subject to the same
(i.e., Canadian) insolvency law. All these traditional barriers could
be breached because the creditors supported the plan and the
legality of the plan was never tested in court. As Gordon Marantz,
counsel for Bramalea, reminds us in his account of the Bramalea
saga, 3 what happened in Bramalea is no guide to what would have
happened had the plan been contested.
He might also have added that it is unclear whose law will be
applied to determine the availability and appropriateness of a
substantive consolidation order where the group has contacts with
more than one country. As a matter of practicality, it seems
unlikely that a Canadian or U.S. court will make a crossborder
consolidation order without the consent of the parties or the
support of the court in the other jurisdiction.
2. Partial Substantive Consolidations
It is accepted law that a consolidation order may be partial in
its scope.'" However, it does not appear to be widely appreciated
that partial consolidation orders are widely used informally in
Chapter 11 proceedings without'the court making a formal
consolidation order. The author is indebted to Professor Lynn
LoPucki for providing him with this information in the course of a
recent exchange of email messages." The author queried
102. Marantz, supra note 93, at 16-17. I have slightly rearranged some of the
wording and punctuation in the original text.
103. See id. at 22.
104. See In re Giller, 962 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
"bankruptcy court retains the power to order a less than complete
consolidation").
105. Exchange of e-mail messages between the author and Professor Lynn
LoPucki (Feb. 3 & 10, 2002) (available on filed with the Fordham Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law).
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Professor LoPucki about U.S. consolidation practices in large
Chapter 11 reorganizations and this elicited the following replies:
" most substantive consolidations in large Chapter 11
cases are accomplished by provisions in the plan
without a court order;
* most Chapter 11 plans involving large companies do
not recognize the separate corporate existence of the
group members- all are "lumped together;"
" in nearly all large Chapter 11 cases, the court confirms
only a single plan covering all of the debtor entities. If
the plan respects separate entities, it is by creating
separate classes in a plan for the creditors of separate
entities. Seldom are more than two or three entities
recognized;
" Chapter 11 does not expressly permit creditors of
different entities (i.e., members of the same corporate
group) to be lumped together in one plan but that is the
practice;
" Chapter 11 does not expressly permit creation of a
common fund for payment of members of the same
corporate group, but this too is common practice. The
initiative for creating a common fund may come from
the debtor or the creditors' committee. In either event,
the plan's contents will be the result of preplan
negotiations;
" preplan negotiations will proceed in the shadow of (1)
what the court would rule if a consolidation motion
were made, and (2) the economics of litigation.
Professor LoPucki surmises that many creditors of
different entities are given the same treatment because
the interrelationships among the entities are very
complex."°
106. Professor Jay Westbrooke, who was privy to this exchange of e-mails,
added the following codicil from his own experience as a practicing attorney in
Washington, D.C., in the 1970s:
I am reminded by this exchange that in the Chrysler workout, which was my last
major case before teaching, the bankers were anxious to keep separate Chrysler
Credit, which had a much higher credit rating and which would have given them
a much larger payout pro rata than the parent. Amidst the tectonic pressures,
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IV. PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIPS: HOLDING THE PARENT
CORPORATION LIABLE FOR A SUBSIDIARY'S ACTIONS
The question for consideration under this heading is the
opposite of the question discussed in the previous part of this
Article. The assumption here is that only the subsidiary is
insolvent and the subject of insolvency proceedings. The question
is under what circumstances a U.S. parent corporation can be held
accountable for the actions of its Canadian subsidiaries and vice
versa with respect to the liability of a Canadian parent corporation
for the actions of a U.S. based subsidiary.
As indicated earlier, the author is not aware of any recent
Canadian cases involving the vicarious liability of a U.S. parent
company for the actions of its Canadian based insolvent subsidiary.
One reason for this paucity of precedents is that it will usually be
much more profitable for plaintiffs to sue the U.S. parent company
in the U.S. than to sue in Canada."
The reasons for this conclusion are the following. First,
Canadian courts, like the British courts, are still wedded to the
entity doctrine of incorporation represented by the seminal
decision of the House of Lords in Salomon v. Salomon & Co."~
Neither thin capitalization nor control of the subsidiary by the
parent corporation are sufficient to lift the corporate veil.'" The
political and economic, of that case, they largely failed. They also failed
partially or completely in similar efforts in other large cases in which I acted in
the late seventies.
E-mail from Jay Westbrooke, Professor of Law, University of Texas, to Jacob
Ziegel, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Toronto (Feb. 10, 2002) (on file
with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).
107. This proposition is illustrated by the asbestos litigation in Amchen
Products v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) [1993] 1 S.C.R.
897, where the plaintiffs elected to sue the defendants in Texas even though the
injuries were suffered in British Columbia. Presumably the plaintiffs' decision to
sue in Texas was influenced by the Texas strict liability regime for harmful
products, high jury awards for compensatory and punitive damages, and the
absence at the time of a forum non conveniens doctrine in Texas law.
108. [1897] App. Cas. 22.
109. For recent Canadian case law see, inter alia, Transamerica Life Ins. Co. of
Can. v. Can. Life Assurance Co. [1996] 28 O.R. (3d) 423 (Ont. Sup. Ct.);
Gregorio v. Intrans-Corp [1994] 18 O.R. (3d) 527 (Ont. Ct. App.); and B.G.
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recognized exceptions fall under the following headings: statutory
and contractual provisions, fraudulent conduct by the dominant
shareholder, evidence that the subsidiary was only acting as the
parent corporation's agent, and proof that the subsidiary's
incorporation was only a facade."'
Second, unlike the U.S., Canada has no strict liability for
defective products causing injury to persons: proof of the
manufacturer's or supplier's negligence is still necessary for a
successful suit."' A third reason is that the Canadian insolvency
legislation has not copied the "wrongful trading" provisions in
Section 214 of the British Insolvency Act"2 or the concept of a
"shadow director" in the British Act allowing a parent company to
be held responsible if it allows the subsidiary to continue trading
when the subsidiary's directors knew or should have realized that
Preeco I (Pacific Coast) Ltd. v. Bon Street Developments Ltd. [1989] 60 Dom. L.
Rep. (4th) 30 (Brit. Col. Ct. App.).
110. The exceptions are exhaustively discussed in the English Court of
Appeal's seminal decision in Adams v. Cape Industries P.L.C. [1990] Ch. 433; see
also Dan D. Prentice, Veil Piercing and Successor Liability in the United
Kingdom, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 469 (1996). For more recent English developments
involving parent-subsidiary relationships in an international context, see Peter
Muchlinksi, Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and
the United Kingdom Asbestos Case, 50 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 1 (2001) and P.T.
Muchlinki, Holding Multinationals to Account Recent Developments in English
Litigation and the Company Law Review II, AMICUS CURIAE, Mar./Apr. 2002, at
25. Recent Canadian cases have also strongly disavowed Justice Wilson's obiter
dictum in the Supreme Court of Canada in Constitution Insurance Co. of Canada
v. Kosmopoulous [1987] 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208 (S.C.C.) (at 213). "[Tlhe best that
can be said is that the 'separate entities' principle is not enforced when it would
yield a result 'too flagrantly opposed to justice, convenience or the interests of
the Revenue."' L.C.B. GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW 112 (4th ed. 1979).
But see Ontario Limited v. Fleischer (2002), 56 O.R. (3d) 417 at 437-40 (Ont. Ct.
App.) (citing Judge Wilson's dictum without referring to its disavowal in earlier
Ontario and British Columbia decisions). The meaning of "facade" in the above
exception is far from clear and has a strong subjective flavor to it.
111. This restriction gives buyers of goods an important incentive to sue the
immediate merchant seller of the product for breach of the implied warranties
under the provincial sale of goods acts since warranty liability under the acts is
strict.
112 See British Insolvency Act of 1986, c.45, § 214 (1991).
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the company would be unable to pay for the goods and services.13
There are other reasons as well that favor a U.S. based suit
against a U.S. parent corporation. Canada has no common law
doctrine of successor liability"" and the question whether the
doctrine of equitable subordination will be followed in Canada
remains unresolved.'15 Assuming problems of jurisdiction by U.S.
courts and objections of forum non conveniens can be overcome, a
Canadian trustee or debtor in possession will also find it
advantageous to pursue voidable preference and voidable transfer
claims against the parent company in the U.S. This is because the
Bankruptcy Code's provisions in Sections 547 and 548116 are much
more liberal than the comparable provisions in Sections 95 and 100
of the BIA."7
These examples squarely raise the choice of law question.
Whose law will a U.S. court apply in respect to Canadian based or
Canadian related conduct of the U.S. parent company? In the case
of lifting the corporate veil, Professors Gordon and Blumberg have
suggested"8 it should be the law of the subsidiary's jurisdiction
whose veil is being pierced.'19 So far as choice of law rules
involving voidable transfers are concerned, U.S. courts have
113. See id. § 251 (1991) (defining a shadow director as "a person in
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are
accustomed to act (but ... a person is not deemed a shadow director by reason
only that the directors act on advice given by him in a professional capacity)").
114. See GEORGE W. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOR LAW § 8.460 et seq. (2d ed.
993).
115. The Supreme Court of Canada refused to commit itself in Can. Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank [1992] 97 Dom. L. Rep. (4th) 385, at
419 (lacobucci J.). For the subsequent lower court Canadian case law, see
Thomas G.W. Telfer, Transplanting Equitable Subordination: The New Free-
Wheeling Equitable Discretion in Canadian Insolvency Law? 36 CAN. Bus. L .J.
36 (2001) (querying the need for the doctrine in Canada); cf. R. Schulte,
Corporate Groups and the Equitable Doctrine of Claims on Insolvency, 18 Co. LAW.
2 (1997) (examining the English position and arguing the need for a doctrine of
equitable subordination to monitor parent-subsidiary relationships).
116. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-48 (2000).
117. BIA §§ 95, 100 (2001).
118. Proceedings Fourth Annual International Business Law Symposium:
Multinational Corporations and Cross Border Conflicts: Nationality, Veil Piercing,
and Successor Liability, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 221, 269 (1995).
119. Id.
CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCIES
applied a variety of tests and none apparently clearly dominates
the field.'O
However, not all is bleak from the perspective of a plaintiff
seeking to sue the U.S. parent in Canada. This is because the
Canada Business Corporations Act'21 and many of the provincial
business corporations acts " have adopted a very powerful statutory
remedy for the protection of minority shareholders and others
including, importantly, a company's creditors." This discretionary
remedy applies where the business or affairs of a corporation or its
affiliates have been carried on in a manner that is oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards inter alia the
interests of any creditor.24 Oppression remedy actions are usually
120. See Jay L. Westbrooke, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies,
17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 516-19 (1991). In the much discussed decision in, In re
Maxwell Comm. Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd., 186 B.R. 807
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995), Judge Brozman favored a case specific choice of law rule
based on contacts and state interests in each case.
121. R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-44, §§ 238-42 (2002) (Can.).
§ 241: Application to court re oppression
(1) A complainant may apply to a court for an order under this section.
Grounds.
(2) If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that in
respect of a corporation or any of its affiliates
(a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a result,
(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have
been carried on or conducted in a manner, or
(c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or have
been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that
unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or
officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters complained of.
The oppression remedy was borrowed from the United Kingdom where it was
first introduced in the Companies Act of 1948. One of the first reported, and
still leading, decision under the new doctrine involved abusive conduct by a
parent company in seeking to freeze out a minority shareholder in a subsidiary.
Id. § 241; Scottish Co-op Wholesale Socy. Ltd. v. Meyer [1959] A.C. 324 (Sc.).
122 See, e.g., Alberta Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, ch. B-15 et. seq.
(2000); see also Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O 1990, ch. B-16, Pt.
XVII, s.247 et. seq. (2002).
123. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
124. See R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-44, § 241(1),(2) (2001) (Can.). Paradoxically, while
creditors are specifically mentioned as a class of protected persons under §
241(2), a creditor can only be a complainant under § 238 with the leave of the
court. On the use of the oppression remedy by creditors, see J. Ziegel, Creditors
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brought outside bankruptcy. However, it is well established
Canadian law that a trustee represents the interests of creditors and
there is no reason why a subsidiary's trustee should not be able to
bring an oppression remedy action against the parent company if he
believes the parent's conduct was responsible for the creditors'
losses."z
V. CONCLUSION
It would be foolish to make firm predictions about an area as
fluid and unsettled as the treatment of corporate groups in
crossborder insolvencies. However, we can learn much from past
experience. The first lesson surely is that national and international
insolvency legislation can no longer ignore the reality and distinctive
problems of corporate groups. A second lesson is that efficiency
imperatives and the expense and difficulty of disentangling
intragroup liabilities and entitlements often drive the parties,
creditors and debtor corporations alike, to agree on at least a partial
substantive consolidation. It is that same consensus that allows
counsel to overcome what otherwise might appear to be insuperable
difficulties in reconciling conflicting national insolvency rules. This is
no reason not to pursue the search for greater harmonization of
substantive rules, but it is a very slow and difficult process.
In addition, in both Canada and the U.S. we need more
systematic, empirical studies of the treatment of crossborder
insolvencies to serve as a reference point for future solutions. Much
useful data already exists, as illustrated by the statistics and reports
referred to in this Article, but that data, and other studies of the same
type, need to be sifted more systematically to identify similarities and
differences and to construct a hierarchy of models to serve as future
precedents.
as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution - An Anglo-Canadian
Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 511, 526-29 (1993).
125. Cf. Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. v. Wise [1998] Que. Judgts. 3571 (on appeal
to the Que. Ct. Appeal) (involving, among others, a trustee's claim for
misfeasance by the affiliates directors leading to the debtor's bankruptcy); see
also Edward M. Iacobucci, A Wise Decision? An Analysis of the Relationship
Between Share Ownership Structure and Director's and Officers' Duties, 36 CAN.
Bus. L.J. 337 (2002).
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So far as the accountability of solvent parent corporations for
the liabilities of insolvent subsidiaries are concerned, these problems
belong to a world of their own and have no organic links to corporate
group insolvencies unless and until the liability of the parent
corporation or other members of the group has been established.
Notes & Observations
